Does a Form E Always Reveal All Crypto Holdings?

Form E was designed around assets that leave a paper trail: bank accounts, pensions, property. Self-custody cryptocurrency does not fit that model, and the gaps in the form are significant enough to matter in contested proceedings.

Form E works for the assets it was built around because third parties hold parallel records. A bank can be compelled to produce statements. A pension scheme provides a cash equivalent transfer value on request. Even a reluctant disclosing party cannot make those records disappear.

Cryptocurrency held in a self-custody wallet is different. There is no institution maintaining a record. The entire burden of disclosure falls on the honesty of the person completing the form. Family law practitioners specialising in this area have noted publicly that Form E contains no dedicated section for digital assets. The catch-all provision at Section 2.20 — which requires disclosure of any other assets not already covered by the form — is the only mechanism available, and it creates significant scope for misunderstanding, omission, and in some cases deliberate concealment.

What Form E Does Not Ask For

A party disclosing cryptocurrency is expected to include it under Section 2.20 of Form E. The form provides no structure for what that disclosure should actually contain. There is no requirement to produce:

• Public wallet addresses, which are the only means by which any third party can independently verify a wallet’s contents and history. A public key functions like a bank account number: it can be shared without compromising security and is the minimum needed for independent verification
• Transaction histories from every exchange account, including accounts now closed
• Details of direct wallet-to-wallet transfers, which leave no bank record but are fully visible on the blockchain
• Any record of decentralised finance activity, staking rewards, or airdrop income
• Any distinction between exchange-held assets, where the platform maintains records, and self-custody assets, where only the holder has access

A party acting in bad faith can write a single line, give a figure that reflects only one account, and be technically compliant with the letter of the form while concealing the bulk of their holdings. Without targeted forensic investigation or a properly drafted questionnaire, that answer is likely to stand unchallenged.

The Screenshot Problem

The most common form of inadequate crypto disclosure in practice is a portfolio screenshot. A party photographs their exchange or hardware wallet balance, attaches it to Form E, and treats the matter as closed.

A screenshot is a photograph of a number at a moment in time. It cannot be independently verified. It shows no transaction history, no record of other accounts, no confirmation that the image shows the totality of holdings rather than a single selected wallet. A balance of £9,000 at 2pm on a given date says nothing about what was held at 9am, or in other accounts that were not included in the frame.

Adequate disclosure means verifiable, complete data. That requires full account statements from every exchange used, public wallet addresses for all self-custody wallets, and transaction hashes for material transfers. Some exchanges make this straightforward. Coinbase, for example, offers downloadable monthly statements. Others, such as Crypto.com, only permit export of transaction history, and some platforms require that history to be specifically applied for in advance. The time needed to obtain this material should be factored in from the outset.

The Lost Wallet Narrative

A disclosure pattern we see with some regularity is the claim that a wallet has become inaccessible. The story typically runs: the party held some crypto, lost the recovery phrase, and the assets are therefore gone and cannot be valued or divided.

In a genuine proportion of cases, this is true. Recovery phrases are lost. Hardware fails. Exchanges collapse. But in a significant proportion of the investigations we carry out, on-chain data tells a different story: wallet activity post-dating the claimed date of loss; funds transferred to addresses that were not disclosed; those addresses linked to exchange accounts also missing from the financial disclosure; transaction patterns showing continued active use. If someone cannot access their wallet, they cannot also be actively transacting from it.

Courts are not required to accept a lost keys explanation at face value. Where forensic evidence raises a credible challenge to that account, the disclosing party carries the burden of providing independent corroboration. Where they cannot, adverse inferences are available.

Partial Disclosure: The Single Exchange Account

Another pattern that recurs is a party disclosing one exchange account — usually a well-known platform such as Coinbase — while others remain undisclosed. The disclosed account is real and accurate. It is also selective.

A properly drafted questionnaire response to any crypto disclosure should require, at minimum:

• A complete list of all exchange accounts ever held, including those now closed
• Public wallet addresses for all self-custody wallets held at any point in the preceding 24 months
• Transaction hashes for withdrawals above a defined threshold
• Details of any direct wallet-to-wallet transfers made during the marriage, including movements between the disclosing party’s own wallets

When Incomplete Disclosure Becomes Deliberate

There is a legal distinction between imperfect disclosure — a genuine attempt that falls short — and deliberate non-disclosure, where the omissions are intentional. Courts have become more attuned to patterns in crypto cases that suggest the latter.

Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 1 is the clearest recent illustration. Mr Justice MacDonald found that the husband’s failure to disclose £371,000 in Bitcoin wallets mid-proceedings constituted litigation misconduct. The costs order that followed — £350,000 against the husband — reflected that finding directly.

More broadly, where deliberate non-disclosure is established, a financial order can be set aside potentially years after it was sealed; costs can be awarded personally against the non-disclosing party; and where a specific disclosure order has been breached, contempt proceedings are available.

For practitioners, the practical consequence is clear. Where anything in the financial picture suggests crypto may be in play, forensic instruction before the First Directions Appointment means the questionnaire can be properly targeted from the start, rather than revisiting inadequate answers after the event.

If you believe that you have fallen victim to a scam, get in touch with us at Wealth Recovery Solicitors for a free consultation. Our friendly and experienced team can evaluate your case, to craft a recovery plan for you and work to recover your funds.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Form E cover cryptocurrency properly?

No. Form E has no dedicated section for digital assets. Crypto is disclosed under the catch-all provision at Section 2.20, which provides no structure for what that disclosure should actually contain.

Is a screenshot of a crypto balance sufficient disclosure?

No. A screenshot cannot be independently verified. It shows no transaction history, no record of other accounts, and no confirmation that it represents the totality of holdings. Adequate disclosure requires wallet addresses, full statements, and transaction hashes.

What if my spouse says they lost their crypto wallet?

Claims of lost wallets can be tested forensically. On-chain data may reveal continued activity from addresses linked to supposedly inaccessible wallets. Courts are not required to accept a lost keys explanation at face value.

What should a crypto questionnaire ask for in divorce?

At minimum: a complete list of all exchange accounts ever held, public wallet addresses for all self-custody wallets, transaction hashes for material withdrawals, and details of any wallet-to-wallet transfers during the marriage.